Domain overview
Cloud offensive work is identity-heavy, API-heavy and automation-heavy. The aim is to map who can assume what, which service can mint trust, and where control-plane decisions become durable access.
How to approach this surface
- Identity-first thinking: enumerate roles, service accounts, app registrations, federation points and token issuance paths before obsessing over individual compute instances.
- Control-plane abuse: cloud management APIs often matter more than a single VM because they can create, snapshot, attach, redeploy or exfiltrate at scale.
- Automation drift: CI/CD, IaC and GitOps pipelines frequently hold the quietest but most scalable route to privilege expansion.
- Container and Kubernetes pressure: namespace assumptions, secret mounting, admission gaps, node trust and exposed dashboards often become the bridge from workload to cluster influence.
- SaaS adjacency: a cloud estate is rarely isolated; identity, mail, file-sharing and ticketing systems often inherit trust from the same provider backbone.
Related certification and framework context
- OffSec SEC-588 / Cloud SecurityCloud-native attack paths, automation abuse and defensive context.
- OffSec PEN-200 / OSCP+Useful when cloud edges still terminate into classic internal attack paths.
- MITRE ATT&CK Cloud MatrixCloud-specific adversary techniques, identities and service abuse paths.
Selected public references
- AWS IAM DocumentationPolicies, principals, role assumption and trust policy behaviour.
- Microsoft Learn ยท Entra IDIdentity provider and cloud control guidance across Microsoft estates.
- Google Cloud IAMBindings, service accounts and permission inheritance.
- Kubernetes DocumentationControl-plane objects, RBAC, admission and workload operations.
- OWASP Kubernetes Top TenCommon cloud-native and container orchestration failure patterns.
Topic index
Cloud Control-Plane Abuse
Cloud work spans provider IAM, management APIs, automation layers, workloads, data services and the trust relationships between them. The operating assumption is that identity and control-plane drift create attack paths long before a traditional host exploit is required.
Kubernetes and Container Escape Paths
Runtime trust boundaries around containers, orchestrators and the control decisions that surround them.
Cloud Identity and SaaS Trust
Cloud trust through roles, automation, deployment logic and control-plane permissions.
IaC, Pipelines and Cloud Drift
Cloud trust through roles, automation, deployment logic and control-plane permissions.
